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INTRODUCTION
After more than three years' experience with the implementation of the Treaty of
Rome (1) ic would seem to be an appropriate moment  to review the main lines along
which policy on competition has developed in the European  Economic  Communiry
(EEC). An appraisal of this oature must be primarily concerned  with the progress
made in establishing the customs union, for it is on this that the Community is based
(Article 9). The aim is the gradual elimination  of customs  duties, the reduction of
quantitative  restrictions in trade between the Member States and the progressive
establishment of common and uniform external duties. The main purpose of the
customs union is, then, the complete  liberalization of trade between  the Member
States with all that this entails for the freedom of economic activicy within the
Community as a whole.
(7) Treaty  establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) of 21 March 1957, entered
into force on 1 January 1958; Articles not otherwise specified are Articles of the EEC Treaty.
The following abbreviations are used  :
Spaak Report -  Report by heads of Delegations to Foreign Ministers, 2t  Apfil 1956
(Intergovernmental  Committee  established by the Conference of Messina),  Brussels, 1956 (in
French and German).
First General Report =  EEC, Commission,  First General Report on the Activities of the
Community  (1-1-58- 77-9-58), Brussels, l7-9-t8 (in English).
Second General Report -  ditto (18-9-58 - 20-3-59), Brussels,  3l-3-59 (in English).
Third General Report -  ditto (21-3-59 - 15-5-60),  Brussels, May 1960 (in English).
Cartel and Monopoly -  Cartel and Monopoly in Modern Law, Reports on supranational and
national European and American  Law, presented  to the International Conference on Restraints
of Competition  at Frankfurt on Main, June 1960, Vols. I and II, in English (and French  or
German).  (Institut fiir ausllndisches und internationales  \Mirtschaftsrecht  Frankfurt am Main
edit.), Katlsruhe 1961.
Von d.er Groeben, aon Boeckb -  Kommentar  zum E\7G-Vertng in zwei B6nden, by tton der
Groeben and aon Boeckh,  Vol. I, Baden-Baden, Bonn, Frankfurt  19)8.
Miiller-Henneberg, Scbuartz =  Gesetz  gegen \fettbewerbsbeschrinkungen, Kommentar,  by
Mijller-Henneberg and Scbuafiz, Cologne,  Bedin 1958.
\Vohl'lartb,  Eoerling,  Glaesner,  Sprung -  Die Europlische  \firtschaftsgemeinschaft,  Kommentat
zum Vertrag, by VohUa.rtb,  Ewrling,  Glaener and Sprang, Berlin, Frankfurt  1960.
Baanbacb-Hefermehl,  -  I(ettbewerbs-  und \(/arenzeichenrecht,  Kommentat,  8th edition by
Hefernehl., Munich, Berlin  1960.At the end of 1961 substantial progress will have been made in establishing  this customs
union: duties wiil have been reduced by at least 35 % (in agriculture) or 40 a/o (in
industry), and in addition the rates shown in the common external tariff will be more
readily appreciated  as a result of the negotiations in GATT (1), the ralks on compen-
sation and the general round of tariff negotiations proposed  by the former US Under-
Secretary of State and present  Secretary  o{ the Treasury, Mr. Dillon. These  rates
wiil be clear evidence of the Communiry's  liberal trade policy vis-i-vis the outside
world. \7here individual Member States with high external tariffs have complied with
the recent recommendation of the European Parliament that autonomous reductions
in customs duties should be made to meet developments  in the economic situation and
applied to trade with non-member countries - 
rhis can be done under the terms of
Article 24 - 
ot where they in furure comply with these recommendations, it means
that these Member  States are going beyond their contractual obligations  in the promo-
tion of greater freedom of trade between the Communiry and the other members of
GATT. ('9) By the end of this year, too, all quantitative restrictions  on imports  and
exports are to be removed  (speed-up decision of 12 May 1960, Articles 34 and 45 of the
Treary). These  steps entail the firm and irrerrocable establishment  of the customs union
as the core of the Community.
By itself, however, this developmenr will not suffice to establish a Common Marker
in the economic sense - 
it will not bring about the integration  of the domestic  markets
of the six economies.  To guarantee the free movement of persons, goods, services and
capital it is not sufficient to abolish customs duties and quotas. The Treary  therefore
requires that, over and above the customs union, a genuine economic union be evolved
to ensure that the oppottunities of integrati,rn offered by the customs union may be
exploited to the fuil and are not replaced by other measures in restraint of trade.
As the traditional barriers between  the six economies are progressively whittled down,
it  becomes increasingly  clear what differe:nces in economic srrucrure, policy and
legislation have grown up in a century and more of industrialization.  These differences
would lead to serious distortions  and would prevent the gradual establishment of the
conditions  characteristic  of a single domestic market. Therefore a genuine economic
union inevitably requires that the economic policies of the Member  States be pro-
gressively co-ordinated fArticle 2 and Article 6 (1)], and in particular a common policy
on comDetition  evolved.
(1) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 30 Octobet 1947.
(z) On 22 Match 1961 the Ftench Council c,f Ministers  approved a number of  customs
reductions to be made in the light of economic developments.  Subsequently  an across-the-board
5 /6 redrction of the rates in operation at the end oI 1,957 was made on I April 1961 vis-)r-vis
non-membet countries, provided, however, that the rates fixed for the EEC common external
tariff were not undercut thereby. In addition, a further )  /e  ted:uction of the 1957  rates
has been made for a number of important products and this too applies, subject to the above-
mentioned proviso, in trade with non-member countries. The total reduction  of duty on these
products  therefore  amounts to 10 /6.THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY'S POLICY ON
COMPBTITION
The obligation  under the Treaty to establish rules governing  competition
Even before there was a Trcaty, the founders of the Community were faced with the
central problem of who was ro be entrusted with co-ordinating the economic plans
of the vast multitude of firms and persons concerned in the various individual markets
constituting the Common Market. The answer was unambiguous  : not a number of
European planning officials unable to cope with so complex a problem, but fair
competition,  based on performance  and governed by statutory rules. (1)
This decision of fundamental  importance  is reflected in several points in the Treaty.
Article 3 lays down not only that a customs union be established  (sub-paragraphs  a
and b), that common policies for certain economic sectors be incroduced  (sub-para-
graphs d and e) and that steps be taken to co-ordinate the economic policies of the
Member States (sub-paragraph g), but it also requires the " abolition, as between
Member States, of the obstacles  ro the free movement of persons, services and capital "
(sub-paragraph c), " the establishment of a system ensuring that competition  shall
not be distorted in the Common Market " (sub-paragtaph f), and " the approximation
of municipal  law (in the Member States) to the extent necessary for the functioning of
the Common Market "  (sub-paragraph  h). In the Preamble,  the Contracting Parties
recognize  the need " to guarantee fair competition ".
(1) See for instance'Spaak Report, pp. 16 to 18 :  "The exclusion of  competition  from
non-member  countries is particularly harmful to the expansion of  production  and to  the
improvement  of the standard of living; it provides both opportunities and incentives to cut
out internal competition  as well. In a large economic area obsolete methods, which mean high
prices and low wages, cannot  be maintained because sound competition will  constantly  force
firms to make investments for rationalization and modernization ;  they will  not be viable
without  such progress.  "
The Report goes on to say that the establishment of a common market requires  purposeful
action of three kinds :
" As a result of the creation of normal conditions of competition and of the harmonious
evolution  of the economies invoived, it will be possible gradually to aim at the abolition of all
protectionist  rneasures which today impede  externaL uade and are the cause of the disrupted
state of the Eutopean economy.
Rules of competition must guaranree  normal  conditions  of competition in order to meet the
effects of State interventions  and monopolies. There must be a common policy to remedy
balance-of-payments  difficulties where these are likely to fettet economic  expansion.
In addition the Common Market  requires, over and above the fusion of existing production
capacities, that new opportunities  be opened up through aid to underdeveloped areas and the
use of hitherto idle labour; v'here necessary firms and workets must be supported in their
efforts to change  over ro more productive  work; finaliy the factors of production themselves'
capital and labout,  must as a result of these measures  be free to move.The Treaty, then, is founded on rhe principle that the course of economic  events
in the Community is to be guided by competition. (1)
Fair competition, to be protected  from distortion, is the organizati<>nal  principle of
the Common Market (2) ; its establishment  is intended - 
in the words of Aticle 2 - " to promote throughout the Community  a harmonious development of economic
activities,  a continuous and balanced  expansion, an increased  stability, an accelerated
raising of the standard of living and closer relations berween  the Member States ".
There are two main groups of provisions which serve to establish the competitive
system in Europe and to give it contenr. The first group is intended to make com-
petition possible within the Community.  This group comprises, first, the provisions
on the gradral elimination of customs duties as berween  Member States (Articles 12
to 17) and of quantitative restrictions  on exports and imports (Articles 30 to 3z),
(r) see aon der Groeben in  oon d.er Groeben, t,on Boeckb, p. XIV ;  aon der Groeben,
" The cartel Legislation of the EEC in the Light of Two years' Experience ", in cartel and
Monopoly,  vol. I, p. 63 (6r, 66); t,on der Groeben, "  Die Europlische  Karteilverordnung 
- ein wichtiger Schritt zu einer europdischen  S7ettbewerbspolitik  ", in Betriebsberatet !)6L, p. 1;
see also other publications,  e.g. VerLoren aan Thetnaat,  " Competition and Restrictive Trade
Practices in the European Economic Community ",  lecture to the Federal Bar Association  in
II/ashington, D.C., on 11 February  1960, pp. 3 and 4 (stencilled) ; Schtmacher,..Der Unter-
nehmer und die \Tettbewerbsordnung  im Gemeinsamen  Markt ", in votrdge auf der Jahres-
haupwersammlung  des Fachverbandes  Stahlblech'erarbeitung  e.V., )  June 1959, p.  l1 (17),
Hagen 7959 ; Giintber, " Die Regelung  des \Tettbewerbs  im EW'G-Vertrag ", I7irtschaft und
\fiettbewerb  1957, p. 27) (2j6, 2)));  coscianz,  problemi  fiscali del mercato comune, p. ]9,
Milan 1958; Rueff, "Une mutation dans les structures politiques : Le march6  institutionnel
des Communaut6s  europ6ennes ", Revue d'6conomie politique 1958, special number, p. 1 (6 et
seq.) ; Kocb, " Das Verhiltnis der Kartellvorschrifren des E\ilG-Vertrages zurn Gesetz gegen
Ifettbewerbsbeschrlnkungen ", in Betriebsberater  1.919, p. 241 ; Franceschelli, Trattato di diritto
industriale, Vol. I,  pp. 6jg-644, Milan 1960 ;  Baumbacb-Hefermebl,  p.  I49O; Kronstein,
" The Significance of the Provisions  Concerning  Restraints of Competition rvithin the Total
Perspective of the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Trcaty", in Cartel and Monopoly, Vol. 1, p. 131
(132-134); Pkiunt, Iansier, Ententes et March6 Commun,  pp. 9-11, paris 1959; Houstiaux,
Concurrence et March6 Commun, pp. 5 et seq., 165-1.67,  paris 1960 ; Rod.ibre, "The prohibition
against Restraints  of  Competition  Contained in  Article 85, paragraph 1 of  the European
Economic Community Treaty, and its Private-Law  consequences  (Article 85, paragraph 2)",
in Cartel and Monopoly, vol. I, p. 273 ;  steindorff ,  " The provisions against Restraints  of
Competition in  the European  Community  Treaties and the National  Law ",  in  Cartel and
Monopoly, Vol. I, p. l9l  (193) ; Hug, Wittschaft und Recht 1960, pp. t72 (19O, t9I,  194) ;
Hag, in Cartel and Monopoly,  Vol. II, p. 639 {,65il.
(2) Accordingly, the EEC Commission  says on p. 59, sec. 78 of its First General Report :
" The aim of the Treaty is not only to stimu.larc competition by the suppression of  the
obstacles to international trade, but to establish a system of fair and healthy competition as
the indispensable  condition for the achievement  of the rational division of economic activities
and {ot ensuring an equitable basis of operations  lor the productive  forces ".  Cf. also European
Parliament, Bericht  im Namen  des Ausschusses  fiir Fragen des Binnenmarktes der Gemeinsihaft
iiber die Oeffnung  der Mdrkte und die rVettbewerbsregelung,  rapporteur  : iepresentative Darras,
Document No. 51/1959, p.  17; also representative Illerhaus in  the European Padiament,
D6bats, session d'octobte  1)60, No, 32 de mars L)61, p. 253 (254),and those on the establishment of a common customs tariff (Articles lB to 29) ;
secondly, the provisions on the free movement of workers (Articles 48 to 5l), the
right of establishment (Articles 52 to 5B), the free supply of services (Articles 59
to 66) and the free movement of capital (Articles 67 to 73); thirdly, the provisions
on the co-ordination of policies relating to economic  trends and monetary policies,
which is to preserve  the general equilibrium  between the economies of the Member
States (Articles 103 to 109) ; fourthly, the rules on the abolition or adaptation of
State aids which distort competirion (Articles 92 to 94) and on taxation (Articles 95
to 99) ; and fifthly, the ptovisions on the approximation of such legislative and
administrative provisions of the Member States as may lead to distortions of competition
(Articles  100 to 102).
.Whereas these provisions creare the conditions for effective competition  which are
nor related to rhe actions of those who are competing,  that is to say the conditions
intended to make competition posfible,  the second group of provisions  have as their
purpose to maintain exiaing competi.tion in a viable state, that is to say to regulate
that part of competition which depends on the actions of those who are competing.
The Treaty therefore rightly describes this group of ptovisions as " rules governing
competition ".  They comprise,  first, European  legislation  against restraints of compe-
tition (Articles  85 to 90), supplemented  by the prohibition  of discrimination  on grounds
of nationality (Article 7), and, second, European legislation  on dumping (Article 91).
This survey of what may be called the Community's economic  constitution would,
howevef, be incomplete if no mention were made of several othef gfoups of Treaty
rules which sefve to round off or to modify the competitive system of the Common
Market.
The Treaty modifies the competitive  system in the dgricultmal sector (Articles 39 to 47)
and - 
to a lesser extent -  in the transpofi sector (Articles 74 to 84). The special
aspects of the Community's agricultural and transport policy cannot be dealt with
in this essay.
The provisions concerning  the Community's social poli,cy arc one of the factors rounding
off the comperirive  system inasmuch as they give it a specifically social slant. In
Article ll7 the Member  States declare that they are agreed " to promote  improvement
of the living and working conditions of labour so as to permit the equalization  of
such conditions in an upward direction ".  They consider that this will result, first
from the functioning of the Common  Market, which will favour the harmonization
of social systems, secondly from the procedules provided for under the Treaty, aod,
rhirdly, from the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions fArticle
II7 (2)1. This means that the EEC Commission  must promote close collaboration
between Member States, particularly in matters relating to employment, labour
legislation  and working conditions,  occupational training and social securiry (Article
flB). Further, men and women workers are to receive equal remuneration  for equalwork (Article 119). Lastly, the Treaty hm established a European  Social Fund to
promote employment facilities and the geographical  and occupational  rnobility of
workers  (Articles 123 to 128).
A further complementary element in the system is provided by the regional policy
which the Treaty renders  possible and in {'act encourages.  Thus, State aids may for
instance be gtanted to promote the economic development of regions where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where serious underemployment exists [Article
92 (3a)). In considering  transport rates and conditions the Commission  must take
into account the requirements of a suitable regional economic policy and the needs
of underdeveloped  regions as well as the problems of regions seriously affected by
political circumstances  (Article 80 (2) ; cf. also Article 82).
Jhe Treaty has also established  a European Investment Bank, whose task it is " to
contibute to the balanced and smooth development of the Common Market " (Article
130). For this purpose it is one of the Bank's functions to facilitate  the financing
of projects which will open up less developed regions.
These and other measures are part of a regional policy intended to improve the
economic and social structure  of such areas. Not only will idle or uneconomically
employed forces be channelled into more productive use, and certain conditions of
competition, especially those resulting  from State investment policy, brought more
fully into line, but also those effects of competirion  which increase prosperity will be
more equally distributed.
The foregoing  has shown how closely  the several elements  of the competitive sy5tem
are related to each other and to measures, introduced as parr of the Community's
social and regional policies, which play a part in shaping the competitive  system.
This connection  must be constantly  borne in mind in the following appraisal of policy
on competition in the narrower  sense of the word, that is to say of policy on State
aids and taxation which distort competition, on the approximation by the Mernber
States of provisions which lead to restriction of competition,  on private restrictions  on
competition and on dumping.
What the competition policy of the Community is to achieve
From what has been said above it  appears that the task of competition policy
in the Community  is a twofold one :  first, rhis policy must establish on rhe
various markets of the Communiry  a situation in which competition is neither
distorted nor perverted.  Such measures may not create any arrificial advantage or
disadvantage for any competitor. Secondly,  care must be taken to ensure that the
competition  thus rendered  possible  can in fact take place, that is to say, rhat it shall
not be possible for it to be abolished,  restricted  or rendered unfair by measures on
the part of the competitors  themselves.This de{inition of the task to be accomplishec is in itself sufficient to show that
neither the creation of genuine conditions of competition nof the protection of
existing competition .or 
"n, a rule be accorded  prioriry in time or pride of place'
The Tieaty is based on realization of the facr. that not only State but also private
measufescanpatalyzecompetitionandthattheycandosonotonlyinisolationor
vicariously but also c.tm.tlut^i.o"ly,  so that both sets of rules must be applied in comple-
mentary  fashion.
\7e speak of the aicariout  et't'ect of State and private restrictions of cornpetition  where'
for instance, an internal dutf which had been making competition- across the frontiers
impossible or had gfeatly resffictec it is then r"pluced by a cartel which proceeds to
redivide rhe nascenr .o-,,'o., market into naiionul  sales or production markets'
Another  case in which state distortion of competition  is replaced by private restriction
ofcompetitionocculswhenenterprisesinaMemberStatewhosesaleshavesolar
been favoured by a rempofafy eie-ption of their products from a tax to which
competing foreign p.od,r.i, *.r.  ,.,bi".t decide, after the cessation of such state aid,
tosupplytheirproductsoniytothosedealer;whonolongerdealincompetitive
ptoducts from abroad. Such exciusive dealing  clauses would wholly or in paft cancel
theaddedcompetitionwhichwasthemainpurPoseofalltheeffortsmadeto
eliminate fiscal aid.
State and private fesrricrions oo competition have a cunrulatiue effect if' for instance'
competirion  within the Commun  ity, )heady hamperecl and distorted  by the continued
existence of internal duties, is in addition restricted by a quota cartel which fixes the
guantitiesofimportsfromoneMemberStatetoanothef.Suchcasesofcrrmulative
restrictions  or, .o-p.ri,io.r by S,u," and private measufes will remain very frequent'
atleastduringthetransitionperiod.Economicallyandlegallyth.ereisnoreasonwhy
such private resuictions of iompetition should be treated differently  from those'
referredtoabove,whichtaketheplaceofstatedistortionsofcompetition.
Conversely, the elimination of private restrictions on the movement of goods and
services across frontiers will not establish  common markets if such private restrictions
can be replaced or supplemented  by state restrictions on trade with identical or similar
effects, that is ," ,"y if-ftiuuttly 
"tgotlated- 
cartel quotas for imports into the other
MemberStatesare,.ptu..dor,opple.,,",'tedbyStaterestrictionsonimports.
Finally,thereareStateandprivaterestrictionsoncomPetitionintheCommonMarket
which neithef feplace nor suPplement private or State restrictions of competition'
For instance,  competition ln u"y ot'e market may be impeded  either by a customs
duty only or by a cartel dividing rhe market. Clearly, b".u.,t" they impede trade
berween the Member States, such restrictions  widn isilated, et'fect cantot be treated
differently from the .esrictio"; with vicarior'rs or cumulative effect'
Numerous other Practical  examples could be quoted to pr?ve.. the same thing over
and over again : the interdepe.ti"n." and feciprocal  effect of all measures  influencing
comPetition.oncewetrnderstandthiswecu.,dra*animportantconclusionfromit:  measures in the various fields of competition policy must always  be considered  in
their context. Fiscal policy, aid policy, carte'l policy, anti-dumping policy and policy
for the approximation  of legislation  must not be devised or caffied out in isolation.
Care must be taken so to harmonize  the measures taken under the Treaty provisions for
the promotion  and regulation of competition, as regards both substance  and time,
that they will not impede or cancel, but on the contrary supplement one another; new
gaps must oot be allowed to develop, but a Europeao system of cornpetition should
be created.
From this there follow quite a series of conclusions. For one thing it  shows
why the cartel provisions of the Trcaty were drawn up nor merely as programmes  (1)
but as direct and' immed'iately applicable la,u(2). Therefore they can and must be
enforced now and not only at the end of the transition period. The more progress
is made in the elimination of State restricti.ons on trade across frontiers, the more
urgent will it be to prevent private restrictions on competition intended to slow down
the effects of this action for the promotion of competition. It is therefore the opinion
of the EEC Commission that State and pri rate distortions of competition  musr be
counteracted  with equal firmness  and on the same principles. (3)
In practice this means - 
and this is the second conclusion to be drawn from what
has been said above - 
that the Commission uses the autbor,i.ty conferred on it by the
Treary to guarantee the uniform and equal application and implementation of the
Treaty in the interest of the Community, its Members  and all concerned  ('cf. Article 155).
(1) E.g. Strickrodt, " Die \Tettbewerbsregeln fiir den Gemeinsamen  Markt ", in Der Betrieb,
1957, supplement No. 9 ol 3-7-1957 ; lVeeberc, Kartel-contr6le  op de Europese  gemeenschap-
pelijke markt, de Naamlooze Vennootschap, 1957, p. g6; Spengler, Die Wettbewerbsregeln dir
EITG (Bundesverband  der deutschen Industrie), Cologne,  1917; Spengler, in Miiller-Henneberg,
scbuartz, Notes 4-8 Appendix  to sec. 101, No. 3 ; Marmo, " Intese consortili e comuniti
economica europea",  in Foro italiano l9j8, IV, p. 170; Carbone,..le  regole di concorrenza  nel
mercato comune ", in Collected lectures : comunitii economica  europea, p. lo9, Milan 1958.
(z) see EEC commission, First General Report, pp.52-63; European padiament, Resolution
of 11 January L959, Iournal officiel des Communaut6s  europ6ennes, p. 161 -  Ifirtschaft und
rtr(ettbewerb 1959, p. 657; see also the Second Cartel Conference of the governmenr  expefts
of the Member States of 11/16 Ja"u,r,y 1959, ITirtschaft und Wettbewerb  1959, p.445.
Cf. Further publications  such as Giin$ber, supra p. 6, r,rote L, pp. 278,287-288; Thiiing, ia
aon der Groeben, oon Boeckb, Introductory remarks 11 to 15 to Articles  85 et seq. ; Koch,
supra p. 6, note 1, pp. 241-242. Cd|otorri, " Sull'efficacia delle regole di concorrenza applicabili
alle imprese della Comuniti  economica  europea", in Rivista di diritto internazionale  1959, p.3
(7-2o); Eueiling, in lY/oblfarth,  Eaerl,i.ng,  Glaemer, s.prung, Note 11 to Article 85; Baunabacb-
Hefernzebl,  p. 1491 et seq. ; with certain limitations  also Steindorff, " Das Verbot von Wettbe-
werbsbeschriinkungen  in der Anfangszeit  der E$TG ", in Betriebsberater 1958, p. 89; coins,
Kronstein, Scblocbaaer, Das Verhiltnis des deutschen Kartellrechts zu den kartellrechtlichen
Vorschriften des EI7G-Vertrages, Frankfurt , 1958 ; Kronstein, supra p. 6, note L, pp. 138 and L4l.
1a; This principle of the Commission's policy on competition has been unanimously  approved
by the Council of the EEC; see Third General Report, p. 106. l0Clearhy, the national  authoficies cannot cope with this task in  isolation, and
conversely the Commission  could not fulfil its function without close collaboration
with the competent national authorities.
From the fieed to co-ordinate and integrate  the Communiry's policy on comPetition
there follows, thirdly, the need for a corresponding  internai organization ot' the
Commision. To take this into accounr responsibility for all questions of cartels,
monopolies, dumping, State aids, raxes aod approximation of legislation is allocated
to one our of rhe Commission's nine Directorates  GeneraT, known  as the Directorate
General for Competition  and divided into four Directorates which deal with the
marters referred to above. Of the nine members who form the actrial Commission,
one is responsible for the work of the Directorate General for Competitioo ; he has
the supporc of two further members of the Commission.  Thete is also close collab-
orarion with the Ditectorates  General  responsible for external trade policy, general
economic policy, the freedom of establishment and the free movement of goods and
services.
At times there has been misunderstanding of both the meaning of the powers and
competences which the Tteaty has conferred on the Community's institutions and of
the pnrpose of rhe substantive Treaty provisions on competition.  Again and agairr
the Commission - 
and the Tteaty  said to have a leaning towafds dirigism
or even a planned economy and the bureaucratic centralism which this entails' It is
often stated that the European  Economic  Community  is an instrument of planned
economy or ar leasr of dirigism, hardly compatible with a liberal economic  order
because of its institutional  machinery and its rules on the condicions and practice of
comperirion. It is said thar free trade could be more easily achieved in a liberal
system of world trade or perhaps in a loose association such as a free trade area, than
in an economic  union which is more rigid in its organization  and its law.
To say this is completely to misunderstand the situation. Just as for instance the
Federal Republic of Germany does not compromise the free market  economy  character
of its economic  system when it permits public intervention where balanced conditions
musr firsr be creaced to make competition possible or to promote it, ot where social
friction must be eliminated, so no majof market economy  such as the European
Economic Community can be put into practice  unless the prerequisites for competi-
rion are created.  Genuine, fair competition does not develoP automatically; often its
external conditions have to be created by the means discussed  and its continued
existence secured by binding rules (1).
1t) Cf. Spaak Report, pp. 18-19 :
" Under the given econornic circumstances  an expansion of the markets and of competition
alone will  not be sufficient to ensure the most rational division of  labour or the most
favourable  rate of expansion.
It  must first be remembered that certaio. enterprises, by virrue of their size or by virtue of
agreements, are able to discriminate, to divide markets and to engage_ in.other  practices  which
airttit .o"ip.titio".  There must therefore be rules of competition, binding upon enterprises, llIt follows that the Treaty provisions  discussed  above and the relevant  measures taken
by the EEC Commission are neither dirigist nor characreristic  of a planned economy;
on the contrary, it is their purpose to make competition function ever more efficiently
ant to keep it in operation as a co-ordinating instrument of the market  economy.
The entire ccmpetitioo policy of the Commission serves this double purpose and it is
to this end alone that the Treaty and the regulations  issued under it lay down the
external conditions of competirion (1). r\ccordingly the powers and competence
of the Commission are very limited and can in no way be compared with the wide
authorify of those who control a dirigist or planned economy. These powers are
further restricted  by the Community's federative structure. This prevents excessive
centralization  but guarantees fruitful and realistic collaboration q,ith the national
executive authorities.
After this survey of the general principles underlying the EEC cornmission's  policy
on competition, we musr now sketch the measures it has taken to pur this poliry
through. \7e will first deal with the measures to abolish distortions of competition
caused by the State and then discuss the sreps taken ro give effecr to the rules of
competition.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY ON COMPETITION
State aids which distort competition
The level start that should be made by compecitors  - 
and consequently their entire
position in the market - 
can be so influenced  by aids that it is no longer possible,
or not possible  wirhout some reservation, ro speak of genuine  competition  based on
individual effort (2). Therefore Article 92 declares any aid which distorts or rhreatens
in order to prevent double  pricing from taking the same effect as customs duties, dumping
practices from endangering  sound production Jnd a divisioq of markets from replacing^ tG
present customs  barriers.
Secondly, we face the fact that various States ate intervening very effectively in  favour of
enterprises in their own country. A distinction rnust here be made between aids which are in
the general interest and aimed at expanding production  and others which  har.e as their aim or
their effect the distortion of competition.
But even if  measutes to favour or protect domestic production are left out of consideration,
the effects. of differing statutory and administrative  provisions on conditions of competition
lemain to be str:died. This difficutt problem requires a careful  analysis  and adequate ,rl.urrrre,
to remedy the differences found. "
(1) See oon der Groeben,  The Cartel  Legislation of the European Economic Community in the
Light of Two Years'Experience,  in Cartel and Monopoly,  Vol. I, p.6J  (65-61).
(z) There still is a considerable  lack of literatute on this subiect. On the relevant articles
see Tbieting in ton der Groehen, uon Boeckh, Notes on Art.93-94; Eaeiling n  \y/ohlfartb,
Euerling, Glaesner, sprung, Notes on Articles 92-94, citing further material in Note 6  to
Article 92; Obernolte, Aussenwirtschaftsdienst  Betriebsberater 1961, p. 68.to distort competition to be incompatible with the Common Market to the extent
to which it adversely affects trade between Member States.
This basic prohibition laid down in Article 92 (1) is made subject in paragraph 2
of the same Article ro three sratutory exceptions and in paragtaph 3 to four further
exceprions  at the discretion  of the Commission or the Council of Ministers in each
individual  case.
The aids permitted  by the law are in the first place social aids to individual consumers,
such as subsidies ro schools to reduce the price of milk supplies to school-children, or
subsidies to health resorts to reduce the cost of cures taken by patients in the lower
income gfoups. The second categofy of aids which come under Article 92 (2) arc
aids granted to remedy damage caused by natural calamities  or other exceptional
events - 
for instance the Fr6jus disaster - 
and certain aids granted to the economy
of certain regions of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of
Germany such as the areas along the zonal border and Land Berlin  (1).
Amongst the admissible  aids there are those granted in favour of economically under-
developed regions, for instance Sicily; aids to pfomote important projects of common
Eoropeun interest or to remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of a Member
State ; and lastly aids intended to facilitate  the development  of certain activities  (e.9. the
film industry) or of certain economic regions, provided that such aids do not change
trading conditions  in a manner that would be contrary to the common interest.
This latter provision is frequently invoked in practice. To understand such aids as
constituting merely some initial financial aid for building up certain activities  or
supporting  certain regions would be giving too narrow an interpretation  to this
provision.  The emphasis should be on economic interpretation in each case. In the
.*perience of the Commission the three following criteria must be carefully observed.
Such aids must be :  selective, i.e. granted only to those who really need them ;
decreasing,  i.e. constantly  tapering down, thereby compelling the recipient to make
an effort of his own; and temporary, i.e. available  for a limited period only. Naturally
aid of this kind must never serve to create a competitive advantage.
In co-operation with the Governments of the Member States the Commission
first made  a survey of existing aid regulations and then studied them. So far proceedings
concerning existing sysrems of aid or projected  aid operations have been initiated in
more than ten cases, and some of these have already been concluded. Several measures
have in consequence been rescinded,  such as the price equalization  fund for rubber
in the Federal Republic  and aids to certain branches of the lrench textile industry.
Other proceedings  are nearing their conclusion, such as the cancellation of tax
reliefs lor the purchase of Italian motor-cars in Italy, which lead to distortions of
competition to the disadvantage  of non-Italian makes.
(1) For more deails see Eaeiling, supra p. L2, note 2, Note L0 to Atticle 92. t3A further group of aids gives rise to pafticularly serious transition difficulties because
of the close interplay of economic, social and political problems.  They include in
particular  State aids for shipbuilding in France and ltaly. In this fietd the joint efforts
of the Commission  and the Governments  have at leasr abeady  produced the result that
both countries  have worked out rehabilitation  programmes  on the basis of which
it may be expected  that these branches of industry will become competitive in the
foreseeable future and thar the subsidies will as a resulr be abolished.
Altogether  the preparatory work so far done by the Commission has shown that aiCs
to industry granted in the six Member States do not always distort competition  as
much as is frequently believed. Naturally the degree to which existing aid systems
are effective also depends on the extent of trade liberalization  reached among the
Member  States. The more the other trade barriers are reduced, the more noticeable
will the aid be with which a State promotes the competitive situation of its industry.
Therefore  the Commission is being particularly careful ro ensure that the improved
competition which is already beginning  to be noticeable in the Communiry  shall
not be nullified by the grant of new aids or - 
perhaps even more important in rhe
immediate ftlsu1s - 
by measures  intended to bypass the legal definition of aid.
Taxes which distort competition
Here again, the steps taken by the commission  are intended to ensure that the
beneficial effects of the reduction  of customs, quora resrrictions and aids shall not be
cancelled by tax measures of similar effect and that the existing  tax barriers, that is to
say the taxes which impair or distort cc)mpetition in the comrnunity, shall be
gradually removed. (1)
To take i.ndi'rect taxation in international  trade first, it  can be said that goods
exported are usually granted exemption from indirecr raxes (drawback) and that a
compensatory  charge is placed on imported goods in order to put them on rhe same
tax footing as competing  home products. Articles 95 to 97 accept this principle of
taxation in the country of destination. In its practrcal application,  however, there arise
such difficulties  of calculation, particularly from the system of a multi-stage  turnover
tax with cumulative  effect which exists in live Member States, that there is no way
out but to fix the compensatory charges on imports and drawbacks on exports by
average rates. This leads to distortions of competition (2) for those goods which
(r) Cf' Cotcianl'l thorough  ffeatment of the subject,  supra p. 6, note L, passim; Neunzark, Die
budgetiren urd steuerlichen Aspekte einer wirtschaftlichen  Integration, Den Haag, L953; for
repercussions of taxes on competition,  see also Schmdlders, " The Principle of Competition in
Tax and Finance Policies ", in Cartel and Monopoly,  Vol. II, pp. 509 "t 
."q. ; in conniction with
the Treaty, see F*cber-Meubauten in aon d.er (|roeben, aon BoeeAlt,  intioductory  remarks  to
Articles 91-99,  and bibliography ; also, Sprung in lVohlfartb,  Eueiling, Glaener,  Sprung, Notes
to Articles 95-99.
(2) For more details  see Janren, " Die Steuern im Gemeinsamen Markt ", in Vortrlge auf
14  der Jahreshauptversammlung  des Fachverbandes  Staihblechverarbeitung e.V. oo 5 Jg61e, 1959,would in effect have to c^rry a tax burden above or below that affecting average  goods.
Moreover, this system is open to abuse because it enables Member States to protect
their domestic  markets from foreign competition by means of excessive compensatory
charges or to grant what amounts to export aids through excessive  drawbacks,  thereby
distorting competition  in the markets of the remaining Member States.  Though Articles
95 and 96 prohibit abuse of this kind, it is very hard to prove because of the
difficulry of calculation.
After the Commission has repeatedly had to deal with cases of this natlrre, the
Council of Ministers, acting on the Commission's proposal, set up on 2I June 1960
a consultation procedure  for taxation  measures  in this field. The Member  States have
undertaken to notify the Commission  two months in advance before promulgating
any proposed  increase of compensatory charges or rates of drawback  and to make
such changes for technical tax reasons only. Meanwhile,  however, some steps initiated
before this agreement and therefore not covered by it have been carried out and
have, in the view of the Commission  and the Member States affected, led to considerable
distortions of competition ; they are the subject of proceedings  which are still pending.
Lastly, both in domestic  and in international  trade, the system of cumulative  taxes, that
is to say of taxes imposed at each processing and sales phase, favours the integrated firms,
which are as a rule large, whilst it puts the small firms at a disadvantage.  Therefore
- 
igr s25s5 whete tax savings  are of importance - 
this system of taxation offers a
strong incentive for vertical integration  and thereby for the concentration of enterprises
and all that means for competition,  the middle classes and the entire economic systern
of the Community (1).
In view of this lack of neutrality which numerous indirect taxes show in their effect
on competition,  the Treaty lays down in Article 99 that the Commission shall consider
in what way indirect taxation can be " harmonized in the interest of the Common
Market ".  It is therefore not a question of whether but only of how harmonization
is to be put into effect. The founders of the Treaty aheady recognized that it was
necessary. (2)  Harmonization does not mean that the tax systems must be made
uniform, but only that they must be mutually adapted to the extent that this is
necessary  to make them neutral from the point of view of competition and thus to
bring the tax systems into line with the competition system of the Community. Three
factors call particularly for consideration: differences in the burden of taxes in the
Member States, the differences in distribution of this burden between direct and
indirect taxes in the various Member States and differences in the tax structure of
the Member States.
p, 2l  (24-25); in great detail Metenberg, Die umsatzsteuerliche  Behandlung der Ein- und
Ausfuhr in den Staaten der E\VG, Bonn  1960 ; Mercnberg,  " umsatzsteuern und Gemeinsamer
Markt", Aussprache  1'959, p. 99 for thorough treatment see Villgerodt,  "Umsatzsteuern  und
Handelsoptimum  im Gemeinsamen  Markt ", Ordo 1958, p. 61 ; Resal, " \Tirtschaftsintegration
und Steuersysteme ", Finanzarchiv,  Vol. 16 (L9r5), p. 3L3.
(1) For greater detail, see Vi'llgerodt,  supra p. 14, note 2, pp. 83 et seq.
(2) Cf. e.C. Spaak Report, pp. 64 et seq. r5Clearly, this is an extremely difficult (1) task, which will therefore need a great
deal of time and can only be achieved in close co-operation with the Governments
of the Member States. As a first step, several working parties of the Commission
have been instructed to study the problems in greater detail. The first results of these
studies ate abeady available. In addition, the Commission  has set up an academic
committee  composed  of leading financial experts from the six Member  States and
one from the United  States.
The Treaty contains only one specific provision  concerning  direct taxation (Article
9B). There is, however, nnanirnous agreement  that studies in this field and a
subsequent harmonization  of direct taxes with a distorting  effect on competition can
be based on Articles 100-i02. ('z) For direct taxes, too, can " distort the conditions
of comperition in the Common lMarket  and thereby cause a state of affairs which must
be eliminated " (Article l0l) ; provisions on direct taxation,  too, can " have a direct
incidence on the establishment or functioning of the Common Market "  and may
therefore  require adaptation (Article 100). (3)
As a first srep rhe Commission has then begun comp^rative  studies of the existing
situation with regard to individual direct taxes in general and various branches of the
economy. Enquiries cover the movement of r:apital, taxation of agricultural and indus-
trial enterprises,  depreciation  provisions,  trade and the insurance system. This has
shown that at a later date a number of mr:difications will be necessary ; it is not
possible to discuss them in the space of this essay.
To sum up, it may be said that the long-term aim of the Treaty's  tax provisions  is to
bring about a taxation  sysrem which is neutral from the point of view of comPetition
and rherefore  consonant with it. Until this goal is obtained the Commission supervises,
so far as possible,  the observance of Articles 95 to 97, which forbid distortions of
competition to the disadvantage  of imports or in favour of exports. This twofold
mandate  is cleady expressed in Articles 95 to 102.
The approximation of provisions  restraining competition
N7hat has been said about the need to harmonize tax provisions which lead to distortion
of competirion within the Community, shows the considerable importance attaching
to rhe approximation  of legislation if the most uniform possible conditions  of compe-
tition are to be established. Articles 100 to L02, as well as some specific  provisions
1r; For the experience gained in the Benelux countries  see Jansen,  supra p. 14, note 2, p. 27.
(z) Schulze-Brachmann,  " Die direkten Steuern und die Doppelbesteuerung aus der Sicht der
ElfG ", Betriebsberater  1960, pp. 62 (63) ; lansen, rupra p. 1'4, note 2, p. 28'
(s) For details and examples see Sahulze-Bracbmatm., supta note 2, pp. 62-63; lor a general
discussion  on distortion of competition through income  tax and company tax see Schmdlders,
supra p. 14, note 1, passim. t6(e.g. Article 220), state that the contracting parties look upon the approximation of
legislation  as an essential means to create a genuine European economic union (1).
In the presenr conrext of creating legal conditions of competition  which are as uniform
as possible (2) the Commission has taken action not only in tax legislation but also
in the following  fields : indusuial property  rights, the public tender system, legislation
on foodstuffs, veterinary legislation and company  law. (3)
In connection  with ind,usrial property rights the free exchange of goods - 
and
therefore international competition - 
may be impaired in various ways, e.g. because
industrial  properry  rights are restricted to the territory of the State which has granted
them. For instance  the legal differences in the Member States make it possible, for
similar or overlapping  properry rights relating to patents, trade-marks or models and
designs to be held by different persons in different parts of the Communiry.  This
means that the import of a producr lawfully manufactured  or distributed in one
Member  Srate can be prevented in another on the ground of an infringement of the
properry right, because in that State the same right is held by someone  else.
\Thereas in this case one of the prerequisites for international competition is lacking,
there are others where they exist but are so dissimilar as to produce an impediment  to
international trade. For instance an invention, a ttade-mark or a model may be
protected in several Member States whereas it may be free to the general public in
others. In the former, therefore, competition is restricted  by the industrial ProPerty
right, but not in the latter. (a)
There is all the more reason for satisfaction, then, when we find that good progress
has been made in this field. On the basis of detailed preliminary  studies by several
working parries  and after consultations  with the Under-Secretaries  of State responsible
for this field in the various Member  States, a beginning is to be made this year with
1r; For more details c[. Strauss,  Fragen der Rechtsangleichung im Rahmen der europdischen
Gemeinschaften,  Frankfurt  1959 ;  MalintoPqL  " Il  rawicinamento delle legislazioni come
ptoblema  di diriao internazionale  ", Rivista di diritto internazionale  19t9, P. 2i9 Q48'261) ;
tron der Groeben, "Die EITG und das nationale I7irtschaftsrecht",  in  Sociaal-economische
wetgeving, Europa-edition,1960, p. I  (11 et seq.) ; Thieting in uon d.er Groeben, aon Boechh,
Introductory remarks and observations  to Articles 100-102;  aiso in gteat detail : Eaerling in
lY/ohlfarth,  Eaerling, Glaesner,  Sprung, Inuoductory remarks and observations  on Articles
100-LO2, and bibliography.
(2) For more detail see Mesenberg, " Zw Frage des Abbaues von Sfettbewerbsverfilschungen
und -verzerrungen in den E$7G-Staaten ", in Betriebsberater 1961, p. l4l.
(3) For more detail  see Third General  Report, pp. 119 et seq.
1+1 These questions and the problem of the approximation of legislation in this fieid are
treated in greater detail in ton der Groeben,  Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz  und Urhebettecht,
Auslands- und internationaier  Teil 1959, p. 629; Froscbntai.er,  lrternational Comparative  Law
Quarterly, Supplementary  Publication  No. 1, (1961), p. t8 ; Lad.as, Gewerblicher  Rechtsschutz
und Urheberecht 1960, pp. 389, 481, t5l;  cf. also other soutces referred to in these works. t7the elaboration of three international conventions: a convention  on European patent
law, one on a European  trade mark law and one a law on models and designs.
Progress has also been made towards aand,ard,izing  tbe system of awmding public
conrrdcrr, In this sector, which is of outstanding  economic  importance,  the award
of contracts  is to be cleared of any discrimination against firms from other Member
States.
Preparatory work for the approximation of legislation in the field of rhe quality,
composition,  packaging and labelling of good.t, especially  foodstuffs, is also well
advanced.  Yarying provisions in this sector can lead not only to differing production
costs and thus to a distortion of competition, but they can also prevent or impede
expansion  across the frontiers and cheaper mass production,  thereby stunting  the
growth of competition  on the various markets of the Community.
In other sectors of interesr to competition policy preparatory  work for the approxi-
mation of legislation will take much longer, as it has done in the field of tax
legislation. This applies in particulat to rhe approximation of com.pany law.
It is not possible within the scope of this essay even to sketch the manifold repercussions
of these provisions  on the conditions and .practice of competition  in the Common
Market. The institutions of the Community and of the Member  States are faced
with an enormous,  long-term legislative task for the completion of which they will
above all require the collaboration  of scholars, for whom numerous and interesting
fields of research are thus opened up. (1)
Private restrictions on competition
Since 31 October 1960, when the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 87,
submitted to the Councll its fint d,raft regalation  (Bt;Jletin 8/9/60, Section 16) for the
application  of the rules laid down in Articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty (2), discussion
on the content and form of the Common Market's cartel legislation  has become  more
intense and more impassioned than ever and not only in the institutions of the
Community which are working our the Draft (3), but also the public circles con-
(1) Cf . Zueigert, " Die Rechtsvergleichung im Dienste der europlischen  Rechtsvereinheitli-
chung ", Rabels Zitschrift filr auslindisches und internationales  Privatrecht  1951, p. 387 ;
Stra*ss, supra p. 17, note 1, passim;  Malintoppi,  supra p. 17, note L; Biirmann, "Die Europiii-
schen Gemeinschaften  und die Rechtsangleichung",  Juristenzeiang  1919, p. 553. For the
approximation  of national legislation  against unfair  competition,  see below, pp. 28 et seq.
(z) Published in \Tirtschaft  und \Tettbewerb 1960, pp. $6-867, with the EEC Commission's
explanatory memorandum.
1e; The Economic and Social Committee  of the EEC was the first institution to submit its
views, which it did on 28 March 1961 (document  CES 45/61 with Annex);  cf. also the
report of its Section for Economic Questions,  dated 14 March  1961, rapporteur : representative
Mal,terre  (document  CES  37 /61) ; the draft is at present under discussion in the European
Parliament's Interoal Market Committeg rapporteur  : representative  Deringer. See inter alia his
preliminary and second drafts for a Committee  report of Jaruary and May 1961, documents
APE t041 and 1690. l8cerned (1) and in writings on the subject. (2) It is both understandable  and useful
that this should be so. For the subject ac issue concerns  nor subordinare marters of
detail, but the first further elaboration of the Treary's rules on competition and
consequently  the future cartel policy of the Community. It appears opportune  at this
moment to set forth the basic ideas upon which the draft regulation and the com-
mission's cartel policy rest and to survey what has been done thus far to implement
this policy. There is no need in this context to deal with a series of individual
problems concerning the interpretation of  Articles 85 to  90, on  which
the Commission (3), its representatives (a) and writers on the subject (5) have
already commented in detail.
(1) E.g. Fack, " Der erste Akt  im  europiischen  Kartelirecht ",  Frankfurter  Allgemeine
7*iwng No. 264 of 10 Nov. 1960, p. 13 ; Hellmann, "Erster Schritt zur EtUfG-!/ettbewerbs-
politik ",  Der Volkswirt No. 46 of  12 November  1960, p.  2104; Drouin, Le Monde of
24 February 1961, pp. 1 and 14.
(2) Von der Groeben, " Die europ?iische Kartellverordnung 
- 
ein wichtiger  Schritt zu einer
europlischen  W'ettbewerbspolitik  ",  in  Betriebsberater  1961, p.  | ;  Mengoni, " Progetto  di
regolamento per I'applicazione  degli artt. 85 e 86 del Trattato del MEC ", in Rivista delle
societi 1p60, pp. 120)-L206 ;  Samkald'en,  " Aantekeningen  bij  de Ontwerp-Kartelverordening
van de Europese  Commissie ",  Sociaal-economische wetgeving,  Europa, L961, pp. 269 et seq.
and 301 et seq. ; lVeyer, " Der Vorschlag der Etil7G-Kommission fiir eine erste Durchfiihrungs-
verordnung  zu den Artikeln 85 und 86 des E$TG-Vertrages ", in  W'ettbewerb in Recht und
Praxis 1961, p.6l;  Spengler, "Verspricht das E$TG-Kartellrecht  ein Faktor der Europiischen
Integration zu werden ? Der Betrieb 1961, p. I2J ; Izstier, "Droit d'6tablissement  et rtgles
de concurrence dans le March6 Commun ",  Le droit europ6en 1961, p.  12 (16 et seq.) ;
Plaisaot,  " La C.E.E. et le projet de rdglement  relatif aux rdgles de commerce  ",  Revue du
March6 Commun 1961, p. 13.
(3) First General Report, pp. 59 et seq.; Second General Report pp. 19 et seq.; Third
General Report, pp. 109 et seq.
(a) Von der Groeben,  supra p. 12, rote l,  pp. 63 (70 et seq.) ; VerLoren  aan Tbemaat,  supn
p. 6, note 1, pp. 15 et seq.; VerLoren tar  Tbemaat, "Europees  mededingingsrecht in ontwik-
keling ",  Sociaal-economische  wetgeving,  Europa, 1960, p.  108 ;  VerLoren ttan Tbenaat,
" Aktueile Probleme  der EI7G-tilTettbewerbspolitik ",  Vortrag vor der Deutschen  Geselischaft
fiir Betriebswirtschaft on 4 March 1961 in I(iesbaden, pp. 7 et seq. (stencilled)  ; Scbamacher,
"  La politique de la C.E.E. en matilre d'ententes ", Revue du March6 Commun L959, p. 207 ;
Schunoacher, Sociaal-economische  wetgeving, 1959, p. j95;  Scbunoacher, "The Procedure for
Giving Effect to Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty ", in Cartel
and Monopoly,  Vol. I, p. )63.
(5) See among  Belgi.an writets del Marntol, La protection contre  les abus de puissance  €cono-
mique en droit belge, pp. $2  et seq., Libge 1960 ; Saetens, " De mededingingsregeling voor
ondernemingen  in het Verdrag ", Rechtskundig  weekblad  of 17 Jannry L960; aan Hecke, " The
Prohibition  against  Discrimination in the Eurolran  Economic  Community Treaty ", in Cartel
and Monopoly, Vol. I, p. )41.
See among  Datch witers Bos, Baardman,  "De kartelbepalingen van het E.E.G.-Verdta8", Zwolle
1960;  Blaisse, " De E.E.G. en her kartelbeleid  ", Sociaal-economische wetgeving  L958, p. 261 ;
Brijnen,  lYertheinzer, " De interpretatie van de kartelbepalingen in het E.E.G.-Verdrag  ", Sociaal'
economische wetgeving  L9t7, p. 253 ; Van Geld.eren, Nededands tijdschrift voor internationaal
recht 1958, p. 366; VerLoren  aan Tbemaat, " De kartelpolitiek in de E.E.G. ",  sociaal-econo-
mische wetgevins l9)7, p. 224. l9The rubrtantiae  cartel law of the Community  is packed into two general
clauses, Articles 85 and 86. Article 85 (1 and 2) lays down a general prohibition
which automatically  renders all cartels null and void. Any agreements,  decisions or
concerted pracrices which restrict competition and are likely to impair trade between
Member  States are prohibited and are null and void. This is the rule; in individual
cases and subject to certain conditions  an exemption may be granted by means of an
administrative  act and in this way such privileged  agreements  and decisions can be
given validity in private law. (1)
Article 86 contains a general prohibition of the abuse of dominant positions within
the Common Market or within a part of it by one or more enterprises,  to the extent
to which trade between Member  States may be impaired thereby.  Nflhereas,  therefore,
Article 85 prohibits in principle any restriction  of competition  by agreement, Article 86
does not affect the existence of enterprises which dominate the market but only forbids
the abuse of the power thus given them.
Article 86, then, does not put a brake on any economically justified uend towards the
optimal size of enterprises or towards industrial mass production in large units. The
intention of this provision is rather to cut out interference  with competition  even
where it does nor come from agreements or concerted practices - 
Article 85 deals
with these - 
but where it stems from a dominant position which may well have
See among French writers Cllment, " The Problem of Delimiting Competence  to Act between
the Commission of the European  Economic  Community and the Individual National Cartel
Authorities ", in Cartel and Monopoly, Vol. I, p. 395 ; Houstiaux, supra p. 6, note 1, pp. 86
et seq., 158 et seq. ; Lagrange,  " Judicial Review of Decisions of Cartel  Authorities ", in Cartel
and Monopoly, Voi. II, p. 909 ; And.rl Marchal, " Les ententes et les concentrations dans le
March6 Commun  ", Revue du March6  Commun 1959, p. 357 ; Plai'sant,  Ittsier, stpra p. 6,
note 1, passim; Re*Ner, "Ententes  et cartels", Revue du March6 Commun 1919, p'  46;
Rod.iAre, supra p. 6, note 1.
See among German writers Deringer, " Zwei Jahre eutoplische Kartellpolitik ",  Europlische
\Tittschaft 1960, pp. 43 et seq. and 66 et seg.; Eaerling in  lY/oblfartb, Eaerling,  Glaesner,
Sprung, notes on Articles 85-90; Giinther, slupra p. 6, note L ;  Baunzbacb'Hefermehl,  notes
pp. 7489-1109 ; Koch, supra p. 5, note l, Kronstein,  supra p. 6, note 1; Schua.ttz, " EWG'Vemag
und vertikale Bindungen  ", Der Markenartikel 1.959, p. j77 ; Seid'l-Hobent,eld'ern,  " Kartellbe'
kimpfung im Gemeinsamen Markt und das Vdlkerrecht", Aussenwirtschaftsdienst,  Betriebsberater
1960, p. 221 ; Spengl,er in Mijl,ler-Henneberg,  Scbuartz, notes in Annex to sec. 101 No, 3 ;
Spengler, " Nationales  und iibernationales  Kartellrecht im E\7G-Yertrag  ",  Det Markenartikel
1960, p. 88L; Stei.nd'orff,  supra p. 6, note 1.
See among ltalian witers Ascarelli, Teoria della c:oncorrenza  e dei beni immateriali, pp. 160-171,
Miian 1960 ; Ballad.ore Palli.eri., " I1 mercato  cornune  italiano e la legislazione italiana  antimono-
polistica ", Diritto internazionale 1959, pp.407 et seq. ; Capototri, supra p. 10, note 2, pp. 2O'25 ;
Catalano, La Comunit) economica europea e l"Euratom, p.  I48, Milan 1917 ;  Francescbelli,
" The Restrictions on Competition That Can Be Exempt from the Prohibition of Article 85,
paragraph 1, of the European Economic Community Treaty (Article 85, paragraph  3) and the
Procedure {or Obtaining Exemption  ",  in  Cattel and MonopolY, Vol. l,  p.  291 ;  further
references by the same author, supra p. 6, note L, p.647, note 15.
(1) See also VerLoren  tan Themaat,  "Erkidrung vor der Fachlichen Gruppe Iiir  \Tirtschafts-
fragen des Ifirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses  der E\ilfG am 4. Januar  1961 ", Europe No' 72
of 25 Janwary 1961, p. 1 (2). 20developed naturally in the course of competition. Another aim is to prevent enterprises
from using mergers to evade the prohibition of cartels laid down in Article 85 and
thus to dominate  the market to the detriment of competition.
It cannot be denied that the provisions of Article 86 are not quite sufficient to deal
with the problems of market domination in an economic system  based on the prin-
ciple of f.ah and undistorted competition.  At bottom the difficulty is to be found
in the monopolistic or, much more frequently,  the oligopolistic situation in the
markets themselves, that is to say in the fact that the individual enterprises can fix
their own prices which therefore become part of their market strategy. This may
lead to undesirable consequences,  such as generally excessive prices, excessive produc-
tion capacities  and so to misinvestment, price rigidiry, automatic price increases after
wage increases and so on. The greater the significance  of the economic  branches
affected, the more disturbing is the influence  which these developments  exert oo the
attainment of the aims of the Common Market.
For these reasons it is of particular  importance that the competition policy of the
Community should not encourage economically  unjustified concentrations of enter-
prises and that it should limit the bounds within which existing oligopolies  can
apply their market strategy. The former aim would be served if for instance tax,
company and parent law, were rendered more neutral in their effects on comPetition
the latter perhaps  by a resolute reduction  of external customs tariffs applicable to the
markets concerned. Measutes  of the second typ" would require exact knowledge  of
how competition functions in these markets. (1)
Experience gained in the interpretation and implementation of Articles 85 and 86
has shown that effective application of these provisions will depend on the passing
of a number of regalationr. In Article 87 the Trcaty itself requires that apProPriate
regulations shall be issued with a view to the application of the principles contained
in the two general clauses, and it confers upon the Council of Ministers authority to
legislate in this field.
The main pturpose of this first regulation is to ensure that the law is uniformly  applied
in all Member Srates, to esrablish predictability of law for all concerned  and, finally,
to create the technical  conditions  under which the Commission can pursue an
effective cartel policy. In what way does the draft regulation endeavour to meet
this threefold purpose  ?
To begin with it repears the principle of probibition which is laid down in Article
8t (1). Article 1 of the draft lays down that agreements) decisions and concerted
practices of the type refered to in Article 85 (1) are forbidden without need of any
prior decision.
(1) See also aon der Groeben, supra p. 12, note 7, pp. 67-69. 2lThat is the legal situation  until the Commission has by a decision declared, under the
terms of Articles 8t (3), that the provisions of Article 85 (1) are inapplicable. The
Commission can make such a decision  only when called upon and the decision is
effective  only from the date it is enunciated [draft Article I (2)]. 'fhe Commission
alone is competent to make such a decision [draft Article 2 (2)].
Therefore restrictions of competition within the meaning of Article 85 (1) can
take effect only if they meet the requirements of Article 85 (3) and if the Commission
has permitted them by issuing a sratement of non-applicabiliry.
This principle,  according  to which an explicit statement  of non-applicability is required,
is modified in two ways.
In the first place for those cartels and vettical restrictions  on competition ahead.y in
exislence at the time the Regulation enters into force and for which an application for
the issue of a statement of non-applicabiliry has been submitted within a certain
petiod, the prohibition contained in Article 85 (1) takes effect only from the date
fixed by the Commission  in a decision rejecting  the application. This provision,  which
is intended as a transition amdngemenl  for existing restriftions on competition, delays
the effect of the prohibition expressed in ,{rticle 85 (1) until the Commission  has
reached a decision - 
provided  the enterprises  concerned submit an application  within
the time-limit fixed.
Secondly, those cartels and restrictions of competition which have come into being
after the entry into force of the Regulation and in respect of which an application
for a statement of non-applicability has been filed, are temporarily not regarded  as
prohibited unless within six months after receipt of the application  the Commis-
sion objects in writing (draft Article 4). Such testrictions on competition  therefore
automatically  become temporarily  admissible  six months after the application has
been filed provided that the Commission  has not raised an objection during this
period; the application remains subject to rejection at a later date.
So much for the exceptions.  The rule, that is to say the direct and immediately
effecdve prohibition  contained  in Article 85 ril), applies therefore to all restrictions of
competition which impair trade between  tr{ember States and in respect of which
no application  for permission has been filed.
In the case of certain especially important categories of existing cartels, the draft
regulation also provides for obl.igatory notilication (draft Article 5). This is intended
to ensure that the Commission shall obtain as speedily as possible a full picture of
these cartels, which may be particularly harmful to the Common Market.  Other types
of cartels and vertical restrictions on competition are, however, not subject to notifi-
cation.
This brings me to the enlorcement of the rules of competition.  \7here the Com-
mission  finds that the provisions of Articles 85 or 86 have been infringed, it can
send the enterprises  concerned  a recommendation to put a stop to the infringement 2Z[draft Articles  8 (2)] ; if necessary  the Commission can adopt a decision compelling
such enterprise to cease the infringement [draft Article 8 (1)].
In addition, the draft regulation empowers the Commission  to obtain information
(draft Article p) and to institute inqui,ries (draft Anicle 11). The Commission  is
empowered to impose finet fuom 100 up to 5 000 units of account (dollars) for
an infringement of the obligation to notify laid down in Article 5 of the draft, and
for incorrect  applications for a statement of non-applicability or for an infringement
of the rules laid down in its Articles 9 and ll  imposing an obligation to furnish
information, to submit  records and to tolerate inquiries (draft Anicle 12). The Com
mission can also, in order to enforce notification in conformiry with Article 5 of
the draft, the furnishing of information (Article 9) or the toleration of inquiries
(Article 11), and the observance of its decisions in conformity with Article 8 (1)
of the draft, impose penalties from 50 to 1 000 units of account for each day of
delay (draft Article l3).
In addition, this draft contains a series of provisions  most of which are of a proce-
d'ural, nature; they govern in particular  co-operation  between the Commission  and
the competent authorities in the Member States, which is of such importance. The
authorities of the Member States take part in the examination of applications for
a statement of non-applicability  ldraft Article 2 (1)l and must be consulted before
the Commission  takes a decision or makes a recommendation  in conformity with
Article 8 of the draft. Under Article 4 (2b) of the draft the competent authority in
a Member  State can, by means of a reasoned submission,  also require an application
for the issue of a statement of non-applicability to be rurned down [draft Article 4
(2)1. So long as no application for permission is filed, the authorities  of the Mem-
ber States are responsible for applying Article 85 (1). It will be seen, therefore,
that only the absolutely  necessary powers are vested centrally in the Commission.
Article 17 of the draft deals with the question of publ,ication:  the Commission  can
publish decisions in which it  finds that Article 85 (1) or Article 86 has been
violated or in which it declares the provisions of Article 85 (1) to be inapplicable.
So much for the essential conrenrs of the draft regulation. A few words remain
to be said about the concep, und'eilying the rulet on competition as well as the
draft, in short on the economic system, the progressive development of which it is
the purpose of the European cartel law to serve. For, as with any other piece of
legislation,  the rules on competition laid down in the Treaty and in the draft regu-
lation can be properly  understood, interpreted and applied only if there is clarity
concerning the purposes they serve. These can be no more than partialiy understood
by the reader who limits himself ro a study of the several provisions taken in
isolation. Here as elsewhere  the aims of the Treaw must be borne in mind when
the provisions are interpreted.
It has been shown in the first part of this essay that, and why, the Trcary has en-
trusted to competirion  the function of guiding, co-ordinating  and stimulating economic 23activities in the Common  Market. (1) To make and to keep competition workable
the fundamental provision of Article 3 lays down that internal customs duties and
quotas shall be abolished, freedom of economic  activiry in various fields put into
effect and a system established  which will protect competition  in the Communiry
against distortion. This is the purpose  served by the set of rules discussed  above,
which prescribe  the creation of the external conditions requisite for competition.
Lastly the groups of rules contained in Articles 85 to 90 and in Article 91 also serve
this purpose. They regulate the external circumstances  governing  international
competition by laying down the limits of the competitors'  freedom of economic
action in the field of contracts (by the basic prohibition of contracts which restrict
competition) and in the field of competition (by the prohibition of certain measures
which have the practical  effect of limiting iq and of dumping).
To sum up, it can be said that the rules gc,verning competition - 
consonant with
the constitutional principles of the Member  States - 
reflect the economic order
established by the Treaty, an order which is both liberal and social in character.
This order is liberal in that the rules on. competition secure and promote the
ind,iui.duah  freed.orn of economic act.i,aity. Such freedom of activity means that the
individual has access to the market, is free to compete with other suppliers  and can
choose in his dealings between several suppliers or consumers.  (2;
The economic order of the Common Market deserves to be called social because the
rules governing competition protect fair conzpeti,tion  as a perftranent elenzent in ,he
market econoflty, indeed as rhe mainspring of the economically most fertile system,
and thereby make an outstanding  contribution  to the general prosperiry and to the
Community  as a whole. In addition the Treary provides for a series of supplemen-
tary social measures, such as the improvement and adaptation  of the social  systems
in the Member  States (Articles ll7 to 122), the establishment of an European Social
Fund to improve opportunities of employment  for workers in the Common Market
(Articles 123 to l2B), as well as several opportunities for regional policy intended  to
make possible a speedier raising of the standard  of living in those regions which are
economically  backward (cf. Article 92 (2a, c and 3a c) ot dub-para a of Article 130.
Cleady, the aims implicit in the rules governing  competition cannot be attained
overnight  equally in relation to all types of international  restrictions  on
competition - 
because the starting positions in matters of economic, legal and
(1) Cf. above pp. 5-6 et seq. with indications in notes l- respectively.
(2) Cf. also oon d.er Groeben, loc. cit. supra p. 12, note l, p. 64; Hallstein, Address to the
International  Conference on Restraints  of Competition, in Cartel and Monopoly, Vol. II,
p. 1009 (1010); Deringer, supra p. 18, note 3, p. 8 ; Rueff, supra p. 6, note 1, pp. 8 to 9;
Kocb, stpra, p. 6, note 1,, p. 241 ; Baumbacb-Hefermehl, Introductory  rcmark 4 and note 25,
pp. 1490 and, 1502; Kronfiei.n,  supra p. 6, note 1, p. 137 ; RodDre, supra p. 6, note 1, p. 273 |
Tbieting in uon d.er Groeben,  uon Boeckh,  Introductory  remark 9 to Articles 85 et seq. ', W'eyer,
supra p. 19, note 2, p. 6l; Hug, supra p. 6, note 1, pp. 190 and 191 ; Hag, in Cartel and
Monopoly,  Vol. II, p. 639 (55)).caftel policy differ gteatly in the six Member  States. It is of coufse tfue that, unlike
a customs tailff. or u qoo,u restriction, a private restriction on competition cannot be
gradually,  quantitatively reduced over a certain period. Since_ the several State and
prirrute restrictions  of competition cannot be gradually reduced pafi passu with one
^another 
in respect of time and cootent, and therefofe no gradual  adaptation  to pro-
gressively increasing  comPetition is possible, the Commission  is here face to face
i,i,ft u major dilemlu oi irt cartel policy during the transition period' If, never-
theless,  such action as is possible is to be taken to meet this need for a comPetition
policy attuned to both sphefes, the existing restrictions  on comPetition will have to
t.  .iurr.d according to the extent of their effect on international trade within the
communiry, u.rd the resulting groups will have to be accofded correspondingly
longer oruhorr". adaptation periods. Priority will have to be given to the abolition
of ihor" types of cariels whose effects resemble those of customs  duties and quotas,
that is to-say those which prevent or impede the establishment of common  markets'
They include in particular international  price, quota and cartels dividing the Common
Murl"t as well as export and import cartels regulating trade between Member States. (1)
A few wolds femain to be said on the Commission's  activity with regard to
conqere  cases comingunder cartel legislation. \7e must note in the first place that
inquiries under Articie 89 into concrete  cases giving feason to suPpose  that Article 85
or Article 86 is being infringed have increased in number. The Commission  has
held meetings with the approlriute officials of the cartel authorities in the Member
States to discuss individual cases and, by facilitating  co-opefation with these authorities
who share with the Commission the task of dealing with these matters, to sPeed  uP
the process of inquirY.
Official inquiries have so far been held by the Commission  in 26 cases, distfibuted
over all branches of trade and industry. In 1l cases inquiries  were started at the
requesr of govefnmental  authofiries,  in B cases as a result of complaints lodged by
erri"rpris., ir associations and in ? cases the step was taken ex officio'
In two cases the enterprises concefned have completely ceased the practices  complained
of and in one case there has been a Partial cessation. In a further case the proceed-
ings have been dropped. Four proceedings were consultative  and nineteen  afe still
pending.
In acldition, the Commission is inquiring into a numbef of further cases where ir is
nor yet certain whether there is adequate feason to susPect an infringement of
Article 85 or Article 86.
Two of the successfully  concluded proceedings  concefned a deliverl' stoP imPosed
by a manufactufef in one Membef State against a dealer in another  under Pfessufe
{rlom the dealers'  association of that second Member State. The action taken by the
Commission  and the national  authofities  concerned has led to the cancellation  of
the deiivery stoP.
(1) Cf. also VerLoren  aan Themaal,  supra p. 19, note 4' p'7' 25In another  case the Commission's  intervention  has had the provisional  result of a
horizontal  and vetical cartel in one country no longer denying access to its domestic
market to manufacturers  from other Member Stares.
The proceedings which were dropped concerned the refusar on the part of a pub-
lisher of a tnde journal to publish advertisements of manufacturers  from another
Member State. The inquiry has shown that neither the conditions referred to in
Article 85 nor discrimination  on grounds of nationality (Article 7) were present
in this particular  case.
The consultation proceedings  had become necessary  because a national cartel authoriry
had to find on the compatibilicy with Article 85 of two licence contracts, a cartel
contract and a re-export prohibition. In the case of the re-export  prohibition, action
by the national authoriry (the Rundeskartellamt in Bedin) was rhe result of a civil
dispute brought before the oberlandesgericht in Frankfurt. This court had, in
conformity with section 90(1) of the Federal German law against restrictions on
comPetition' notified the Bundeskartellamt of the dispure. In accordance with
section  90 (2) of the Federal German law against restrictions on competition,  rhe
Bundeskartellamt, having consulted  experrs, informed the Commissjon that in this
case the re-exporr prohibition constiruted arr infringement of Article gj (1). (1)
In addition to the above, there has been co-operation with cartel experrs from the
various countries over an inquiry carried out with the purpose of discovefing domi-
nant potitions in tbe market. This inquiry covered four important sectors of the
economy.
Moreover, in connection with the prepararioo  of reference material on the competi-
tion situation to be used primarily in an effort to uncever infringements  of Article 85,
a beginning has been made with an inquiry into price movemenrs  and intra Commu-
niry trade in several  products.
Dumping and unfair competition
Article p1 (1) of the Trcaty empowers the commission to issue recommenda-
tions to the originator of any dumping pracrices which it finds to exist within the
Common Market. (2) In October 1950 a second conference of dumping experrs
employed by the Governments of the Member Srates and the commission met in
(t) This problem in treated in greater detail by scbwartz, supra p. 19, note 5, pp. 322 and 326; I*tz, Basson, Der Markenartikel 1961, p. 103.
(z) There is a considerable  shortage of contemporary research  into mafters of dumping.  On
the rules contained in the Treaty see Eaerling, Der Betrieb 1960, p. 999 with further
bibliography in note );  Eaerling, Der Betrieb 1960, p. ll47 ; a description  of the various
dumping  laws is contained  in GATT, Anri-Dumping  and countervailing Duties, Geneva, 19)g ;
Eckert, Das Dumping in der nationalen Gesetzgebung und in internationalen  Venrigen, thesis,
Tiibingen  1960, with further bibliography  pp. 9 et seq. 26Brussels and went fully into the scope of this provision. The experts were agreed
that Article 91 (1) can be applied only if a product is exported at less than its
"normal value" and if materiat injury is thereby caused to the coffesPonding industrial
sector in a Member State (cf. Article VI of GATT).
It follows from this that dumping  can be stopped in various ways : by remedying
the injury caused by eliminating the export price difference or by the comPlete
stoppage of any exports into the injured country.
A recommendation  simply to stop exports to the injured country is out of the
question for two reasons : it would be in conflict both with the Treary's aim to
encourage trade among the Member  States and with Article VI of GATT.
Likewise, a recommendation to an exporter to remove the difference between his
domestic  price and his export price would at best be compatible  in exceptional  cases
with the Treaty aims and the purpose of Article 91 (1). The Treaty does noc
prohibit double prices, that is to say it does not prevent exportefs from adopting the
prices of competitors in an export market even though in so doing they may under-
cur rheh own domestic prices. In such a case exporters merely take their price from
the market, that is to say they adapt themselves to the market situation and in
exercising their freedom of competition, which is guaranteed  by the Trea\, they are
following normal competirive practice. Even the Treacy establishing  the European
Coal and Steel Community,  which in contrast to the EEC Treaty forbids  price
discrimination lArticles 4 (b) and 60 (1)], lays down explicitly in Article 60
(2b) that enterprises  shall always be entitled to align their quotations  on the lower
prices charged by competitors. (1) Moreover, in a competitive  economy based on
social principles the fixing of a low consumer price cannot be condemned  in
itself, at least so long as dumping by the exPofter does not cause any substantial
injury to foreign comPetitors.  This it will not do in general if exporters  quote a
price on the export market which is lower than the price they demand on the
domestic  market but above or equal to the price quoted by competitors on the
export market.
Therefore the main question to be considered by an enterprise affected by a charge of
dumping, or in applying Article 91 (1) (like Article VI of GATT) in a way which
will nor unduly impede international competition and trade, will be whether foreign
competitors have suffered substantial injury through an abnormally  low export price.
If so, a recommendation  could be made to the exPorter mefely to ensufe that his
products are no longer supplied to consumels abroad at a pice lower than that
obtaining in the importing country, if the price in that country is below that at which
the exporter  sells his products on his domestic market. Naturally the import duties
charged by the importing countfy and any other differences  influencing  the compa'
rability of these prices must be taken into consideration.
(1) Cf. Mertrriicker, " The Prohibition  against Discrimination in the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty " in Cartel and Monopoly,  Volume l, p. 123 (326, 330 et seq.) ; with special
reference to dumping  see Echert, supra p. 26, note 2, pp. 118-119. 27So far the Commission  has brought 11 cases under Article  91 (l).  Six of these
concern the chemical industry, three the foodstuffs  industry and two the medical
instruments  industry.  Six applications  have been made by trade associations, two by
injured  enterprises  and three by official authoriries of the Member States. In these
complaints a total of 26 enter.prises have been cited as originarors of dumping
pfacrices.
The proceedings have led to the following  resulrs : in four cases no acrion was
taken because either the complaint  was unfounded from the outset or it lost its
justification during the proceedings as a result of a change in the factual situation.
In two cases the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint finally and in two others
provisionally. In two cases the complainr has given rise to the despatch of a rec-
ommendation to one of the enterprises  zrgainst whom the complaint had been
brought, whereas the cornplaint against the other enterprises was rejected, having
lost its justification  during the proceedings as a result of a change in the factual
situation. In one case rhe complaints  are still under consideration.
In the light of present experience  the proceedings in connecrion with dumping  have
been successful. In most cases the pracrices complained of were stopped after a
simple oral discussion  between the Commission  and thc parties concerned. This is
the reason why so far recommendations  have been addressed  to only nvo enterprises.
To sum up, it may be said that the commission does not pursue :its anti-dumping
policy in isolation  but regards it, in the same way as its cartel policy, as an integral
part of the community's  policy on competirion and endeavours  to implement it in
this light. If fair and honest competition is to be kept alive not only must restrainrs
on competition be countered but also excesses in competition  must be prevented.
Real dumping constitutes such an excess, it is a type of unfair, dishonest comperirion
which up to now has received very little attention from lawyers and other experrs.
To counteract it is therefore one of the commission's important tasks from now
until the end of the transition period. In this the Commission  is favoured  by the
fact that dumping within the common Market will of necessity become gradually
more difficult as barriers to trade are abolished and the characteristics  of a domestic
market develop within the Community.
\Thereas therefore the practical  irnportancer  of unfair comperirion through dump-
ing practices is gradually diminishing in the cornmunity, the question of what
otbet competitiue practicet in the nascent European  markets of the Community must
be regarded  as unt'a.ir is constantly gaining in practical significance.
Many enterprises are aheady faced with che need ro extend thek alae*iting to the
territories of the other Member Srates of the EEC. This gives rise to the problem
of how to evolve the most effective international  publicity without coming into
conflict with the law on unfair competition,  some aspects of which vary gready fuom
one Member State to another. This applies in particular to misleading,  comparative
and high pressure advertising. 28Corresponding problems  arise in connection with what is known as competition  by
obstruction (Bebi.nd.erungsuettbeuerb').  It seems that a ruling is needed on what
constitutes unfair competition by obstruction or cut-throat methods in international
trade.
The Treaty does not provide any direct answer to those and other questions con-
nected with legislation  against unfair competition. It merely contains provisions  on
the lreedom of competition in the supply of goods and services across frontiers, but
says nothing about the fairness of competition except for the anti-dumping provisions
of Article 91, which settle only one side of the problem. By therefore merely pro-
recring international competition against restrictive but not against unfair practices,
the Treaty regulates only one aspect of the struggle between  those who are
competing,  but they must conform with the rules against unfair competition appli-
cable in each individual  state.
However,  the absence of a European law against unfair competition does not mean
thar the differences between the national legislations  on this subject must continue
to exist for ever. The Treaty opens up another  path which will in the course of
time make it possible to judge faitness and honesry in international competition by
standards of law which are as uniform as possibie and so to provide protection for
such methods: this, under the terms of the Treaty, can be done by approximation  of
municipal legislation against unfair competition, whethet such legislation is based
on staftrte law or jurisprudence or both. Under Article 100 the Council,  acting on a
proposal  of the Commission,  issues directives for the approximation  of such legislative
and adminisrative provisions of the Member  States  as have a direct incidence on the
establishment  or functioning of the Common Market (see also Article 101). (1)
In the field of legislation against unfair competition, as in others, the Commission
has taken preliminary steps to execute this long-term task, seeking in this way
to do everything  that can be done from this angle to maintain the efficiency of the
international competition which is emerging. In several Member States the possi-
bilities of establishing uniformity in municipal legislation against unfair competition
are being considered.  (2)
Here again the co-operarion of scholars is indispensable.  For it is a prerequisite
of progress towards the unification of law that the existing legislation, juris-
prudence and writings in rhe Member  States dealing with the various aspects of
unfair competition  should be systematically collected  and compared. So far there
(1) Of course the six Member States can also, as they are proposing to do for the law on
patents, uade-marks and designs and models - 
5ss 2fevs page 17 - 
66n6luds  a State Treaty
in which they lay down the rules which are to govern the appraisal of problems of competition.
(2) Cf. the German Federal Minister of Justice Scbaffer,  " Unlautere rtrferbung  im Gemein-
samen Markt ", Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Auslands- und internationaler
Teil 1960, p. 281 ; aon Ganznz, " Angleichung des sfettbewerbsrechts in der EIfG ", Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1960, p. 2127. 29are no srudies in comparative law covering the whole of this field. (1) Doubtless this
difficult task will take some time. fn return, a carcIully prepared approximation of
legislation in this field will one day lead to enterprises in all Member States being
subject to approximately equal rules on fair competition in domestic and international
trade. This would constitute a further important step towards the practical implement-
ation of the European system of competition which is one of the objectives of the
Treaw.
(1) For a short review of this problem,  including the law at present applicable in the Member
States, see Saint-Gal, " Unlauterer und parasitbrer \Tettbewerb ",  Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz
und Urheberrecht, Auslands- und internationaler  Teil 1956, p. 202.
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